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Abstract 
This paper unpacks the performativity of transparency inside the organization. 
Organizational members often use digital technologies to make their actions visible  to 
others in the organization. However, practices of visibility produce opaqueness as much 
as transparency. In our qualitative study in a telecommunications organization, 
organizational members sometimes made their actions transparent to their colleagues 
and managers, while at other times they played numbers games and made their actions 
opaque. We take a sociomaterial perspective and investigate how practices of visibility 
are performed by organizational members while using digital technologies. We consider 
the temporality of visibility making practices, to better understand how they emerge 
and how they produce transparency and opaqueness. We illustrate how transparency 
and opaqueness are produced interchangeably , as actors are oriented towards the past, 
present, or future. The study extends our understanding of information visibility inside 
organizations, by bringing to the foreground its sociomaterial and temporal nature. 
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Introduction 
Whereas making something transparent presupposes that it makes it visible (Roberts 2009), making 
something v isible does not necessarily  mean making it transparent. It could also become opaque. Digital 
technologies have often been considered to be powerful in increasing transparency  in organizations 
(Brivot and Gendron 2011), governance structures (Garsten and Montoya 2008) and in society  (Hansen 
and Flyverbom 2015). As digital technologies increase v isibility  and monitoring of employees’ actions and 
performance across all levels of hierarchy, several scholars have studied their disciplinary and regulatory 
power (Elmes, Strong, and Volkoff 2005; Zuboff 1988), as well as their use for coordination purposes 
(Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates 2006; Orlikowski 1992). However, most scholars, taking a technological 
deterministic perspective (Boudreau and Robey  2005; Orlikowski 2010), have overlooked how technology 
 Playing the Numbers Game: Dealing with Transparency 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 2 
may  be enacted in ways that preserve the user’s autonomy  and pr ovide a distorted view of the reality  on 
the work floor to the supervisors. We still lack a comprehensive account of how employees perform 
practices of v isibility while using the digital technologies that render their actions v isible  to other 
organizational members. We draw our focus on this aspect, aiming to answer the research question: How 
is transparency enacted in practices of visibility performed through the use of digital technologies in the 
workplace?  
In this paper, we study  transparency  by  focusing on the practices of making employees’ actions visible to 
other organizational members (colleagues, managers, employ ees from other departments, etc.) . Drawing 
upon work on transparency  in similar contexts, such as rankings (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015) and 
reviews (Orlikowski and Scott 2014), this study  follows a sociomaterial perspective (Orlikowski 2010), 
with the goal to untangle the perfo rmativity  of transparency, as this is enacted through the use of 
information sy stems. We conceive of the performativity  of transparency  as the mechanism through which 
“the making v isible starts changing that which is rendered transparent” (Roberts 2009 :958). We consider 
performativity as sociomaterial (Orlikowski and Scott 2014 :874), thus conceiv ing of reality  as enacted 
through performance of sociomaterial practices. Following the call of Roberts (2009), we aim to further 
understand how the dev ices that make human actions visible are mutually  co nstituted with the agency  of 
humans whose actions become v isible, through these very  actions. Practices of v isibility  performed 
through the use of digital technologies can have a temporal orientation, as digital technologies enable 
monitoring performance in real time, evaluating past performance (v ia storing past data), as well as 
forecasting future performance (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015). Consequently, to understand the 
performativity  of transparency  −and thus why  people often conceal more through digital technologies 
instead of making transparent (Cunha 2013; Hansen and Flyverbom 2015)− we need to also examine its 
temporality. We do so by  following the chordal triad of agency  approach developed by Emirbayer & 
Mische (1998). This approach suggests that agency has a temporal orientation. People perform a practice 
while oriented towards the present, past or future. 
In order to unpack the performativity  of transparency, we performed a qualitative study  in a la rge 
telecommunications organization. Through interv iews and observations with employees in the marketing 
and sales department, we got to develop a thorough understanding of how transparency  and the lack 
thereof, i.e. opaqueness, emerge through the daily  ac tions of account managers, while using a CRM 
sy stem for managing their sales work. We analyzed the practices through which the account managers 
made their actions v isible to their colleagues, managers and other organizational members , which 
sometimes produced transparency  while at other times they  produced opaqueness.  The way  they  made 
their actions v isible, while being oriented towards their past, present and future performance,  was 
entangled with the material reality  of the past, present and future constructed by CRM data. We found 
that the materiality of the CRM sy stem triggers account managers not only to act transparent, but also to 
act opaque as they  interact with the system, and reflect on their past, present and future. Our findings 
contribute to the recent discussions on how transparency  is manufactured with the use of digital 
technologies (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015), by  unpacking the performativ ity  of transparency  as such 
emerges over time. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we draw on theories of transparency, digital 
technologies, sociomateriality and the chordal triad of agency to construct a performative perspective on 
transparency. Subsequently, we provide details on our research approach, the research setting and the 
research methods followed. In the analysis of the findings section, we unpack the performativity  of 
transparency  as this emerges in the practices of v isibility  performed by  sales employees. In the discussion 
section, we try  to extend our theorizing on the performativity  of transparency  across time, and discuss the 
contributions of the study and implications for research.  
Towards a performative view of transparency 
Visibility, transparency and opaqueness in the workplace through the use of 
digital technologies 
Making something transparent means “casting light upon what would otherwise remain obscure or 
inv isible” (Roberts, 2009: 957). Transparency  within organizations can be defined as casting light upon 
the behaviors, activities, routines, output and performance that emerge at the lower hierarchical levels of 
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organizations (Bernstein 2012). The potential of transparency to counter opaqueness (Roberts 2009), by 
illuminating what would otherwise remain concealed, has strongly  related the concept to notions of 
coordination (Metiu 2006; Tuertscher, Garud, and Kumaraswamy  2014), accountability (Hansen and 
Flyverbom 2015), regulation (Garsten and Montoya 2008) and surveillance (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 
2001). In this regard, organizational scholars have been concerned with the role of transparency  in 
management of organizations (Bennis, Goleman, O’Toole, and Biederman 2008; Bernstein 2012; Hood 
and Heald 2006), and have considered it as a powerful form of governance (Fung, Graham, and Weil 
2007). Several studies illustrate the efforts of managers to increase v isibility  of employees’ work inside 
their organizations, for example by redesigning the office spaces (Elsbach and Pratt 2007), introducing 
surveillance systems (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992), arranging peer scrutiny  mechanisms (Sewell 1998), 
and adopting information and communication technologies for real-time monitoring of activ ities (Elmes 
et al. 2005; Leonardi, Treem, and Jackson 2010; Orlikowski 1991). Another well-known practice for 
increasing transparency  consists in the development of performance measurement sy stems, such as the 
balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996), target systems (Ball and Wilson 2000; Frey , Homberg, 
and Osterloh 2013), rankings (Hansen and Fly verbom 2015) and reviews (Scott and Orlikowski 2012). 
The development of digital technologies during the last decades has had a vast impact on the developme nt 
of practices that reinforce visibility in organizations. Data produced by digital technologies provide 
inscriptions (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Robson 1992) of employees’ actions that take place on the work 
floor, while the data stored in information sy stems and infrastructures serve as historical apparatuses 
which capture events that took place in the past. Having the possibility  to informate (Zuboff 1988), 
information systems have the potential to reveal the actions and performance of an employee to other 
organizational members and enable better coordination of collaborative activities amongst coworkers as 
well as performance evaluation and control by  managers.  Technologies such as enterprise sy stems (Elmes 
et al. 2005; Sia, Tang, Soh, and Boh 2002), knowledge management systems (Brivot and Gendron 2011) 
and enterprise social media (Leonardi et al. 2010) make organizational processes and employees’ actions 
v isible in both real time and for later investigation. 
However, making something visible does not necessarily mean making something transparent. Making 
something v isible could also entail disguising its appearance prior to making it v isible so that its real form 
cannot be easily seen. In other words, making something v isible could also be making something opaque 
(Roberts 2009). Thus, while several technologies have been developed with the intention to make 
information transparent, such as executive information systems (Walstrom and Wilson 1997), computer-
based performance monitoring (Ball and Wilson 2000; George 1996), or management support sy stems 
(Clark, Jones, and Armstrong 2007), quite often the data that is fed into those technologies keeps 
employees’ actions and performance opaque. Organizational members often play  numbers games when 
interacting with those systems, e.g. by adding false data in their time-recording sheets or performance 
measurement sy stems (Roberts 2009).  
Performativity of transparency 
Notwithstanding the popular belief that transparency  reinforces bureaucratic forms of organizing (Adler 
and Bory s 1996), recent studies question the effectiveness of transparency  in controlling an d regulating 
activ ity  (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015). For example, the studies by  Collinson (1999) and Bernstein (2012) 
show that transparency  may  influence the performance of employ ees and thus may  end up obscuring 
more than exposing when put into practice. Taking these into consideration, we suggest exploring further 
the tension between transparency and opaqueness by unpacking the performativity of transparency.  
Performativ ity  is an onto-epistemological lens developed in gender studies and post-humanism (Barad, 
2003, 2007) and Actor-Network Theory  (Latour 2005; Law 2004; Pickering 1995), which v iews reality  as 
a dy namic, practical accomplishment, and suggests that the world is enacted in practice. Practices are 
performative, in the sense that they have productive consequences, and thus produce the world (Scott & 
Orlikowski, 2014). In the context of studying technology  in organizations, performativ ity  can be v iewed 
from the perspective of “sociomateriality  mattering” (Gond, Cabantous, Harding, and Learmonth 2015), 
which deals with how things constitute reality through actors' sociomaterial practices. Such a v iew 
suggests that actors, meanings, and roles are constituted within sociomaterial practices, i.e. they  are 
“dy namically  brought into being through the continuous flow of practice” (Gond et al., 2015: 9). In other 
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words, the notion of performativity entails that the enactments of sociomaterial practices recon figure the 
world, thus the world is alway s in the making (Orlikowski and Scott 2014).  
From a performativity  perspective, the enactment of sociomaterial practices of making things tr ansparent 
influences how we v iew the world, and thus how we further enact transparency . Roberts (2009: 958) 
addresses the performativ ity  of transparency  in light of the fact that transparency, apart from merely 
making something visible, can also have other unforeseen effects, “such that the making v isible starts to 
change that which is rendered transparent”. The performative effect of transparency  explains why 
practices of v isibility  often produce opaqueness rather than transparency. For example, let’s assume that 
employees store data about their actions in a sy stem for the intention of coordinating the work amongst 
each other. As this information becomes transparent to other colleagues and to their managers, it could 
trigger the employees to store inaccurate data, to avoid showing potential failure to their managers, or to 
be more competitive against other colleagues.  
In order to unpack the performativ ity  of transparency  of employees’ actions to other organizational 
members, we take up a sociomaterial perspective (Orlikowski 2007, 2010; Orlikowski and Scott 2014). 
Such a view conceives of “the social and the material as constitutively entangled in everyday life” 
(Orlikowski, 2010: 125) and gives equal importance to both human and non-human actors. Approaching 
transparency as  enacted in practices of visibility, manufactured in the entanglement of humans and 
materials (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015), can expand our understanding of how rankings are constructed 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2014; Pollock and D’Adderio 2012; Scott and Orlikowski 2014), how numbers take 
the role of “inscriptions” that help govern at a distance (Miller 2001; Roberts 2009; Robson 1992; Vollmer 
2007; Vollmer, Mennicken, and Preda 2009), or how forecasts are produced and interpreted by  managers 
and controllers (Faÿ , Introna, and Puyou 2010). Furthermore, taking a sociomaterial perspective 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2014) to study  practices of v isibility  might help us better understand the tension 
between transparency  and opaqueness, i.e. whereas transparency  is aimed to shed light on employ ees’ 
actions, it often ends up reinforcing their opaqueness. Such a tension has been highlighted for example in 
the way  managers use performance data for impression management (Cunha 2013), in the problematic of 
imperfect numbers in performance measurement (Andon, Baxter, and Chua 2007; Dambrin and Robson 
2011; Jordan and Messner 2012), in the strategic micro-practices of calculation followed by  accountants 
and middle-managers (Fauré and Rouleau 2011), as well as other cases of fraud in accounting (Cooper, 
Dacin, and Palmer 2013; Neu, Everett, Rahaman, and Martinez 2013).  
Temporal emergence of transparency 
In their study  of politics of transparency  in the digital age, Hansen and Flyverbom (2014) examine how 
“disclosure devices”, i.e. mediating technologies in manufacturing transparency , help provide not only  a 
retrospective type of disclosure, e.g. by analy zing past data that represent traces of actions, but also an 
anticipatory one, which includes making predictions from analy zing real -time data. This distinction 
suggests that practices of v isibility  have a temporal orientation. As soon as the data that traces people’s 
actions is stored in an information system, it can be used not only  to control their actions in the present, 
but also to evaluate their past performance as well as to predict their performance in the future. Thus, in 
order to understand the performativ ity of transparency, we need to consider also the temporal 
orientations of v isibility making practices.  
In order to examine the temporality  of v isibility  making practices, we follow the chordal triad of agency 
approach (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). This approach v iews human agency  as a “temporally  embedded 
social engagement, informed by  the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a 
capacity  to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity  to contextualize past 
habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment)” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998 :963). 
Thus, when actors perform an action, they  perform it while being oriented towards one main temporal 
orientation: they  may  be oriented towards the past and e.g. perform something as a habit, toward the 
future, because they  imagine how this may  look like, or toward the present while trying to deal with a 
practical issue in the moment. However, Emirbayer & Mische (1998) suggest that the agency behind social 
action can only be understood in its full complexity . They argue that at any  given moment in time, actors 
are oriented toward the past, the future, and the present, b ut they  may  have one primary  orientation 
toward one of these. This is why  they  speak of a “chordal triad”: at any  given moment an actor has one 
dominant temporal orientation toward one of the past, future, or present, while at the same time the actor 
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also has sub-dominant orientations toward the other two.  Thus, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) 
analytically distinguish three elements of agency. As actions are performed along the chordal triad, each 
element has as a dominant temporal orientation, it is also influenced subdominantly  by  the other two 
orientations. The iterational element is oriented to the past v ia memory  or the historical apparatus that 
serves as memory. The projective element entails imagining the future. The practical-evaluated element 
is structured in the present and concerns making practical judgments. 
The temporal orientations of practices of v isibility  making (i.e. employees making their actions and 
performance v isible to other organizational members) are not solely triggered by humans, but also by the 
digital technologies through which these practices are performed. For example, t he v isibility  that digital 
technologies offer in real time enables transparency  of present actions. The historicity  produced by  digital 
technologies enables transparency  of actions that were performed in the past.  The inclusion of 
algorithmic models for forecasting based on real-time and past data helps project activ ities into the 
future. These temporal dimensions of v isibility  making practices, intensify  the material effects that human 
actions have through the technologies that render them transparent, and can thus influence their being 
rendered v isible or opaque. In the following sections, we are going to investigate how the performat ivity  of 
transparency emerges across the three temporal dimensions.  
Research methodology 
We performed a qualitative study  following an inductive approach (Locke 2001) in TelCo, a large 
telecommunications organization. We conducted our study  in the Marketing and Sales department of the 
business market division. We focused on two sales channels: in Sales Medium, where account managers 
work in pairs of internal and external account managers, who together serve a set of 250 -300 small or 
medium-sized customers; and in Sales Large, where all account managers are responsible for a set of 15 -
20 large customers each, whom they  v isit often in order to maintain the relationship and work on 
projects. Account managers are responsible for managing the relationship with customers, maintaining 
the current contracts with them, and getting them interested in buy ing new portfolios. They have to 
generate leads that are later picked up by  specialists, who are responsible for preparing t he order and 
closing the deal. TelCo has a targets-based culture, aimed to reward employees with a yearly  bonus for 
attaining high revenues from sales. Targets are not divided equally, but they  are calculated based on the 
potential revenues of the customers. As all account managers aim for lower, easier accomplishable targets, 
the determination of the targets every  year often involves contestation amongst account managers and 
sales managers, over who has higher and who has lower potential in generating future revenues, and thus 
should be assigned with a higher or lower target respectively. 
We started by  investigating broadly  how work was performed by account managers in the sales 
department of a telecom organization. We directed our attention to the micro-activ ities that account 
managers followed in their everyday  work. By  focusing on their actions, we developed a thorough 
understanding of how various technologies are constituted in their practice. Not surprisingly , a CRM 
(Customer Relationship Management) system emerged as the most important too l for the account 
managers. The scope of the CRM sy stem was to manage information about customers, sales 
opportunities, the status of orders and so forth, and to coordinate sales work across Marketing and Sales. 
Thus, the CRM sy stem enabled v isibility  of the account managers’ actions to the rest of the account 
managers, their team managers and higher management, as well as other stakeholders such as customer 
support and financial management employ ees. The reality  that the CRM sy stem represented was shaping 
and being shaped by  the account managers’ actions. By  observing how account managers enacted the 
CRM sy stem, we identified the actions through which they making their actions transparent and opaque 
to the organization. Our later analy sis extracted the orie ntation of these actions to the present, past and 
future. By  analyzing the relations between these temporally oriented actions, we got to construct a 
performative view of transparency, as such emerges through the practices of v isibility  that the account 
managers perform while using the CRM sy stem. 
Our study at TelCo lasted for 24 months, during which we got a rich understanding of how account 
managers worked in Sales Medium and Sales Large, and how they  dealt with the transparency  enabled by 
the CRM system in their organization. We collected data mainly  via semi-structured interviews (Weiss 
1995) and complemented it with ethnographic observations (Emerson, Fretz, and Linda 1995; Spradley 
1980). As their work is relational, to get a better understanding of their context we also interv iewed people 
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they  collaborated with, namely  sales managers, marketers and analy sts. In total, we performed 77  semi-
structured interv iews recorded and transcribed verbatim (72.5 hours of recorded time), 21  observations 
(85 hours observ ing time) and 182 pages of single-spaced notes, and used 66 internal (presentations, 
figures, reports) and external (annual reports, press releases) documents.  
We performed our analysis using a practice lens (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Nicolini 2012), try ing to 
capture the routinized ways through which people act while intertwined with other human and material 
actors (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). We analy zed the data using guidelines from grounded theory 
approaches (Corbin and Strauss 1990). In order to further understand how the performativ ity  of 
transparency  emerges in time, we examined the second-order codes that represented actions of being 
transparent or opaque. For each action, we reflected on whether it was mainly  oriented towards the past, 
present or future (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), and categorized it in one of the three respective 
categories. Then, we returned to the first-order codes and identified the elements of the past, present and 
future in each action. This analysis resulted in unpacking how the performativ ity  of transparency  emerges 
in time. 
In our narrative, we try  to “render the actual” (Smets and Jarzabkowski 2015; Van Maanen 2011 :232) by 
explaining the practices through the v iews of three exemplary  account manager s (Nick, Kate and Alex), 
that are composed by  the full breadth and depth of the data we collected through our interv iews and 
observations with the account managers at TelCo.  
Case analysis 
Understanding the account manager’s DNA: Looking at the practice of an 
account manager 
Before div ing into the actions through which account managers at TelCo deal with transparency, we find it 
important to acquaint the reader with the account managers’ practice, in order to better understand the 
way s through which their actions become transparent or opaque.  
Our analy sis highlighted two elements that constitute the core of the practice of the account manager: 
First of all, (1) managing the relationship with the customers  is central to the practice of an account 
manager. This entails frequent contact with customers, either by  phone or through visits. Account 
managers usually consider what is called “farming” as a necessary  action: maintaining good relationships 
and planting seeds that will eventually  flourish into business op portunities. For this, they  develop and 
sustain a personal relationship with their contact persons (e.g. by  going to soccer games together), which 
allows approaching them easily to build trust, stay  updated on the developments of their businesses, and 
find new sales opportunities, which, through the good relation, can eventually turn to orders.  
Second, account managers always (2) strive to reach the sales targets by  the end of the year, which will 
ensure receiving their bonus. For this reason, it is important to stay alert to extend the current contracts, 
to maintain the revenues that are already  taken into account for the revenue target. They  often put 
pressure on the specialists to close deals by  the end of the year, to reach the order intake target. Kate,  an 
internal account manager in Sales Medium, regularly checks the CRM reports on revenues and orders to 
evaluate how far she and her external account manager are with reaching their target. If she sees that they 
are underperforming on one of the portfolio  targets, she shifts to routines that will ensure quick wins, for 
example by arranging focus days during which she works only on a product-push basis. 
“I think time pressure is always with the sales function. Not only for yourself, for your own target, but  
also for TelCo as an organization. So the numbers we have to reach, when we know it’s going to be 
difficult, we have to adjust some with our strategy… So it’s always about every quarter, but end of the 
year is the most important date.” (Account manager in Sales Large) 
Taking the above elements of the practice into consideration, we can now shed light on the everyday 
actions that an account manager follows: (3) Contacting the customer takes place either via v isiting the 
contact person at the office or phone calls. (4) Finding sales opportunities involves being well aware of 
the business processes of the customers, getting to know their strategy  and plans for the future, and 
understanding their needs. The account manager has to (5) store sales opportunities in the CRM system, 
assigning the status “suspect” to the customer, together with details about the portfolio the opportunity  is 
 Playing the Numbers Game: Dealing with Transparency 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 7  
about and the story  behind it, e.g. “expanding to a new location in June 2016”. Also, it is important to 
estimate the value of the opportunity, and to add a date when the opportunity  will be active , in order to 
contact the customer in time. 
(6) Planning when to contact which customers and for which portfolios  takes place on a regular basis. 
Developing an account plan at the start of the y ear helps keep in mind when the big deals are going to take 
place. Planning is also done on a weekly  basis, to decide which customers to call or visit in the following 
day s. Alex, an account manager from Sales Large for instance, arranges his plan based on two rules: one is 
making sure that he contacts the customers early  enough before their contract ends, in order to increase 
the chances for renewal. He has several information systems in which he keeps track of customer 
contracts in different portfolios. The other rule is checking the sales opportunities he has stored in the 
CRM: he checks the Sales Opportunities pages on a regular basis, and ranks the opportunities on the date 
they  are active: in this way  he can see which opportunities are coming up,  which have the highest value, 
and so forth. 
“CRM is very important, because it’s an overview of all our chances. Of course I know what has 
happened with my customers, but CRM makes us predictable. And in CRM we can sign the customers 
and with the different chances that are active at our customers, so we can say ok with this customer for 
the next few years we have this chance, that chance, this chance… So we can be predictable. I think that’s 
the most important thing of the CRM.”  (Account manager in Sales Large) 
(7) Generating leads is the main responsibility  of all account managers. Kate explains how she typically 
generates the leads: when there is a sales opportunity, she contacts the customer and tries to get him 
interested in the portfolio. If the customer is interested in receiv ing an offer, she goes to the funnel of the 
customer in the CRM sy stem (showing the customer’s phase in the sales process), finds the opportunity, 
and changes the status of the customer from ‘suspect’ to ‘lead’. She adds the name  of the specialist who 
should pick up the lead. She also updates the expected value of the order, which she now knows better 
than in the suspect phase. The funnel has different percentages for calculating the potential revenue 
depending on the customer’s phase customer: 20% for suspect, 40% for lead, 60% for prospect, 80% for 
hot prospect and 100% for customer. So after registering the lead, the forecast for her future orders will 
also increase in the system. After registering the lead, a mail is automatica lly  sent to the specialist to check 
it. In this way, Kate starts (8) collaborating with the specialist for the related portfolio. The specialist will 
prepare the offer and present it to the customer. Although it is not her responsibility, Kate often stays 
involved in the process until the deal is closed, so that she can maintain the relationship with her 
customer, as well as make sure that the deal will be closed in time for reaching her targets. 
(9) Doing administration is the least desirable activity  for Nick, an external account manager, as it is to 
most account managers. It is however necessary  most times. Sales opportunities  and leads have to be 
stored and a good overv iew of the customers’ funnel needs to be recorded, in order to plan the right time 
for contacting them about a portfolio  and to coordinate with others. Although Nick’s sales manager often 
tells him how important it is to keep this information updated on CRM, he often finds the sy stem 
incapable of capturing the complexity  of his customers (e .g. because they  have multiple business units, 
they  are stored with different identifiers). For this reason, Nick makes sure he also stores the information 
in his own Excel files. 
(10) Preparing before contacting the customer is a common routine for all account managers. For 
example, before calling a customer, Kate, the internal account manager from Sales Medium, tries to get 
information about the company  as quickly  as possible: she looks at the website of the company and 
searches online to see if the customer was mentioned in the news recently. She will search for the 
customer in the CRM sy stem and check his funnel information, what sales opportunities she has stored 
for the customer, while she will also look at the interactions tab to see what she had talked about with the 
customer and if the customer had been in contact with someone else from TelCo, e.g. for a customer 
service issue. She will also have a look at the figures in the CRM sy stem to see what the customer pay s to 
TelCo every  month, what debts the customer has, and so forth. Also, she will look at the contracts that the 
customer has with TelCo. Taking into consideration all this information, she can then steer the discussion 
with the customer to introduce a portfolio in a natural way .  
Evaluation of the account managers takes place in different ways: Every  Friday, Nick, the external 
manager from Sales Medium, has a check-in/check-out meeting with the whole sales team, where he 
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presents the leads that he created that week, the status of his deals, and his forecast for next week. Next to 
those meetings, Nick has monthly individual meetings with Mike, his sales manager, who challenges him 
on the major business opportunities and provides Nick with direction when he is facing difficulties with a 
customer. Mike checks several monthly  reports and figures that are produced from the data in the CRM 
sy stem: order intake report, funnel report, all orders report, order mutation oversight, outdated funnels, 
denied orders, sales desk report about offers, oversight of the account overviews, oversight of the funnel, 
won/lost figures, white spots report, and others. Hence, when Nick meets with Mike, they also talk about 
his performance based on those CRM figures: 
“Every opportunity, I set it on the CRM. And those opportunities, they give an image for my supervisors, 
and he can see what I ‘m doing for the next months or the next years.”  (External account manager) 
Transparency and opaqueness in making actions visible 
When analy zing the account manager’s practice in the first stages of our research, certain inconsistencies 
emerged that triggered our attention. Although the account managers emphasized the usefulness of the 
CRM sy stem in planning and preparing for the conversation with their clients, they  often mentioned that 
they would maintain their own administration, or that they frequently  found inaccurate information in 
CRM, or that they were asked to fill in lists manually  with customer information. For example, Alex, the 
account manager from Sales Large, mentioned: 
So when you get the garbage in, you get also the garbage out (chuckles)… The management has chosen 
for a system, and for a management structure, which provides to get as much information in the system 
as you want. But also, they manage the account management with that system. We call it 'Excel 
managers'. So for the last years, many account managers have put in so many funnels, and at this 
moment, you get the garbage out. There are many funnels, and the amount of money that is in our 
pipeline is huge, but when you get it to reality, it’s just a little bit…  (Account manager in Sales Large) 
These observations made us curious to explain how such inconsistencies emerged. By  study ing further 
how account managers were enacting the CRM sy stem, we understood that the v isibility  of information to 
the whole organization and in real time offered by  the system, usually  enables the sharing of know ledge 
and coordination (e.g. planning which customers to call, preparing before calling, or collaborating with 
the specialist to transform a lead to order), but also it can often trigger the account managers to fill in false 
data. As Nick, the external account manager from Sales Medium, explains, filling in the correct or false 
data in the CRM sy stem is consistent with different goals  that matter to the account manager at the time: 
“Yeah, but the thing is that it depends always on what the goal is. If the goal is gain less target, then it’s 
a good thing to give less potential, so the target will be less as well. But if the goal is that  we have to 
develop so many clients after a year, then it’s good to give a lot of potential. It depends on which goal 
that list at that moment is, you know…” (External account manager) 
Using the chordal triad of agency  (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) as a sensitizing device, we examined the 
practices through which account managers made their actions v isible to colleagues, managements and 
other stakeholders inside TelCo. Through the v isibility  making practices, depending on their temporal 
orientation towards acting in the present, reflecting on the past or projecting the future , account 
managers are sometimes transparent and at other times opaque.  While each action emerges with one 
dominant temporal orientation, we also identified how it is simultaneous ly  oriented subdominantly  to the 
other two orientations, as “secondary  tones” of the chordal composition (Emirbayer and Mische 1998 
:979). We unpack the temporal dimensions of being transparent or opaq ue (while making actions v isible 
to other organizational members) in the following paragraphs: 
Being transparent in the present 
Account managers act transparently  in the present by  showing their current performance to the rest of the 
organization. Data about contracts that were signed, revenues that came in, invoices, etc. are stored in the 
CRM sy stem by  account managers, specialists, or customer serv ice employees and feed weekly  reports 
such as revenue charts and status of the order intake. Such data is co nsidered to be “hard data” i.e. it does 
not incur ambiguity , and thus makes the sales performance transparent in the organization. Every 
Monday, Nick and John, as an example of a pair of external and internal account managers in Sales 
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Medium, check the weekly  figures in the CRM sy stem to track how they  are doing with their individual 
targets on revenue and order intake. Their sales manager also checks the figures and estimates how the 
team is performing. Reflecting on the figures from the stored data helps them project whether they  will 
reach their targets by  the end of the year. Hence, when they  see that they  are running low on one of the 
team targets, they look for ways to increase sales on a specific portfolio, e.g. by organizing a focus day . 
“Well, we use CRM, so if there are any sales opportunities, I just put them in, and they can see it, every 
Monday morning they get a list with the companies, so they can see, and once every two or three weeks 
we have a meeting with the account team, […] and we just talk it through…”  (External account 
manager) 
Being opaque in the present 
The weekly  funnel report brings all major business opportunities to the spotlight instantaneously: 
Account managers, specialists, sales managers and others can immediately  see what is coming up and 
deserves attention. Nick doesn’t really  like that his big opportunities become v isible in the CRM. Every 
time his sales manager notices these opportunities he starts putting pressure on him, by  asking questions 
and giv ing him directions on how to proceed. In addition, every  time this happens he starts receiv ing 
phone calls and e-mails from specialists, deal makers and other people, who want to get involved in the 
offer (looking after their bonus), while he wants to involve the people who he th inks fit with the customer 
and the specific deal. As he projects all this pressure, Nick prefers “stay ing under the radar”: when he 
submits the opportunity  in the CRM sy stem, he sets a lower value, so that it doesn’t attract attention in 
the funnel report. As long as the customer’s status is “suspect” or “lead” in the funnel, Nick is the only 
person who can edit this opportunity ; in this way  he can hide his big potential, but he can also go back to 
the opportunity  and change it to the higher, original value, when the offer starts being prepared. This 
editability  of the opportunities is a feature that distinguishes the materiality  of this opaqueness practice, 
from how it could be performed on paper or by e-mailing Excel files, instead of using the CRM sy stem. 
 “If you put such an amount, you’re always in the spotlight. The deal is in the spotlight, so managers see 
it, specialists, other people see it, and people want to get something of it, you know… If they have an 
opening or door to get to this deal as well,  either with you or without you, it doesn’t matter, yeah… Then 
they try it, you know?”  (External account manager) 
“Window dressing means that I have a lead, and that’s a lead for one million, but when I’m going to say 
it’s one million, the whole organization is in my back, so when I say he’s 100,000 then nothing, no one 
will ask about it.”   (Account manager in Sales Large) 
The weekly  and monthly  figures in the CRM sy stem make it very  easy  for sales management to check how 
account managers are performing. Nick is always stressed about his white spots. TelCo has the rule that 
account managers should have a lead for every  portfolio with their customers. The white spots list 
indicates when there is no lead stored in CRM sy stem for one portfolio. Every  time he ap pears to have 
white spots in the report, his sales manager starts asking him questions during their monthly  meetings. 
Anticipating that in case he has white spots he will have to explain why he had no lead for that portfolio 
with that customer, he chooses to store a fake lead in CRM: even if he adds a value of one euro, the 
algorithm that checks the white spots will consider it as a true lead so he’ll be out of the white spots list.  
 “Well, sometimes you know that in this certain customer there is just no o pportunity for that. And if you 
leave it blank you get a white spot, and you can put no opportunity, but then you have to make sure that 
there really is no opportunity, and… So sometimes you just put in a lead for one euro, for 2013, and then 
you’re off the hook!” (Account manager in Sales Large) 
Also, Nick sometimes acts opaque in the present by  try ing to make things look bright. Reflecting on how a 
figure on past CRM data can give a good impression to the management, he expects that management will 
be happy if they  see a brighter situation in the figures than in reality . In this perspective, he adds untrue 
data in CRM, not only  to influence his indiv idual performance, but also because sales management may 
want to give an optimistic picture to higher management.  
“Yeah, of course… Because, Excel lists and everything you have to fill in… sometimes you just hear that 
you have to make a little bit more pretty than it really is, just for head management.”  (External account 
manager) 
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Due to these opaqueness practices, the CRM sy stem contains also inaccurate data, which decreases the 
efficiency  in planning and coordinating the deals. Thus, maintaining a shadow administration in Excel or 
hand-written notes becomes handy to keep up with the customers, but also enable s hiding information 
from others, who would see it in the CRM sy stem.  
“They are going to make their own list, which isn’t in the system, so that the headquarters can find it. 
The salesman and the sales manager, they have their dialogue based on the real data, and they put some 
data in the CRM system, ‘so that those jerks from the headquarters won’t bother me with all kinds of 
questions and difficult processes’”.  (Manager of Sales Intelligence) 
Acting upon past transparency 
Data such as invoices can be thought of as “hard data”, which could not have been intentionally  distorted. 
Thus, figures based on such data always constitute a transparent lens on how account managers 
performed in the past. Also, such data remains in the CRM forever, haunting the account  managers. To 
take the example of Kate, the internal account manager from Sales Medium; at the end of the year she is 
evaluated on her overall performance during that year. Management looks at the figures on her order 
intake and revenues; if she has reached her target, she gets her bonus. Kate often reflects on these figures 
as well to estimate her upcoming evaluation, or to estimate whether she needs to do more orders to ensure 
her revenue target.  
“But your question was how they control it... They see by the way turnover, if it’s going up or going 
down, if you get the orders in, and if you lose any, what story is there. That’s how they control…”  
(Account manager in Sales Large) 
Another way  through which the account manager acts upon the transparency  produced in the past is 
looking at the information that has been prev iously  stored by  others. While preparing, Kate reflects on the 
interactions that the customer had with customer service employees or with the account manager before 
her, and estimates what she will hear when she calls the customer.  
“The CRM shows the funnel, and it shows what the account manager before me has put about the 
potential of the client, so we also used that to look which customer was interesting at that moment.”  
(External account manager) 
Acting upon past opaqueness 
Considering the inaccurate leads and opportunities that account managers registered in the past and 
never updated, or manually  entered data that was accidentally  wrong, the CRM sy stem includes also 
opaqueness produced in the past. It is possible that a figure calculated from past CRM data is not correct. 
This leaves room for casting doubt on past figures to negotiate in the present and influence the results in 
the near future. For example, if the figures from last year’s  orders show that Kate had a small dev iation 
from her target, she can question the numbers to get her bonus.  
“Well not all those reports, but the outcome of the total has a direct effect on the pay plan, so when you 
are going to say ‘the figure isn’t correct’, then we have to clarify that. In all cases we have to do some 
manual handovers. Everybody makes mistakes. So in the dataset there are about 1 .2 million records per 
month. Somebody makes a mistake, so there’s always an inconsistency… And the sales person will 
always find that one. Because he knows what he has done with his customers, we only have the data. So 
he can see the difference in outcome. So he will challenge the quality of the data in total, therefore the 
total data isn’t right and the discussion is happy.”  (Manager of Sales Intelligence) 
Being transparent to influence the future 
Storing the information about the customer such as interactions and sales opportunities enables building 
a sketch of the customer in the CRM system, which is and will b e visible to many stakeholders. Alex, the 
account manager from Sales Large, finds it easy to look at the information stored from the prev ious 
account manager when he gets a new client. Projecting that he will change his customers set in a couple of 
years’ time, he wants to ensure that the account manager after him will serve the customer well. Storing 
information about his customers in CRM ensures retaining knowledge of the customer for the future.  
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“They know the customer, but TelCo doesn’t know the customer. So I think they need their input. And I 
think CRM will be a nice system to put info in. Because it’s in their head, you know what I mean? […] 
And if somebody is moving, gets a promotion, and somebody else takes it over, and if everything is 
already in the system, it’s nicer to start…” (External account manager) 
The availability  of all the data in the CRM  sy stem, combined with the analytics capabilities of TelCo, 
enables forecasting the future revenues. Alex  knows that such information is always importan t to the top 
management, who need the forecasting reports to provide estimations about the revenues in the next 
years to the shareholders. Thus, he is reinforcing the predictability of sales, by storing the sales 
opportunities in the CRM sy stem, projecting that this will help TelCo be transparent. 
“We can predict what is going to happen in the future. And TelCo is at the stock of [name of stock 
exchange office], so the people who are investing money, TelCo wants them to know what is happening 
in the future, so we have to be predictable. And that’s the reason that higher management, [name of 
sales director], he wants to know what is the business for the next few quarters, and for the next years. 
And then you have to be predictable, and CRM is helping us with that.”  (Account manager in Sales 
Large) 
Being opaque to influence the future 
The data stored in the CRM sy stem will eventually  feed new figures and reports that can influence 
decisions in the future. Projecting the influence that the data and figures from this data can have in the 
future, the account manager may choose to be opaque in order to fiddle with such figures. Alex is always 
concerned about his future targets. He knows from past experience the “game” that is played in the start 
of every  year with the calculation of sales targets, in which all actors negotiate about who should get a 
higher and who should get a lower target. If the sales management sees a very  high opportunity in his 
funnel, they  could assign him with a higher target compared to other  account managers. Projecting how 
easily  a major opportunity  will become v isible in the funnel report in CRM and (based on past experience) 
expecting that it will immediately  attract attention with the risk of influencing his future targets, Alex 
prefers setting a lower value than the real one if he has to store a very high opportunity.  
“When you fill in that a customer maybe would sign for a contract for one million, then also, it would be 
possible that your target is changing, it would be higher. So some people try to stay low, under the 
radar… And if they are successful, great, but if they’re not successful, they didn’t lose anything, in the 
system...”  (Account manager in Sales Large) 
The CRM sy stem allows for the major business opportunities to easily  a ttract the attention of 
management, as they will alway s rank the funnel report based on the value of the opportunities. Alex 
knows from past experience that management develops high expectations when they  see a major business 
opportunity  appearing in the weekly  reports, so it will be more severe if they  eventually  see in the 
oversight of the funnel that it didn’t turn to an order. Projecting the possibility  of not closing the deal for a 
major business opportunity  and appearing to have failed, Alex  prefers t hat his opportunity  doesn’t rank 
high in the weekly  reports, and thus sets a lower value when storing it in the CRM sy stem.  
 “And everybody is playing the safe side. Because if you put in a lead for a customer project is probably 
worth one million… As soon as you put it in for one million, [there will be] visibility, and so the end 
management will have a lot of attention on you and your project. So if you fail, then [the failure is] 
visible. So that’s why people are holding back, until they know for sure th at they are right about it.” 
(Account manager in Sales Large) 
Finally, the CRM sy stem allows for the sales opportunities to become v isible across various sales channels. 
Thus, a high sales opportunity that flashes in the weekly  reports can trigger politica l discussions about 
where the customer should be allocated. In fact, in the start of every  year customers are reallocated to the 
sales channels based on their revenues and it is a well-known principle that customers who bring very 
high revenues deserve to get more attention and to be served by account managers in a higher customer 
segment. Nick, the account manager from Sales Medium, has had experiences in his team, when they  had 
to lose their high potential customers to Sales Large. He knows that his big o pportunity will start 
“flashing” in the weekly  reports and will attract the attention of Sales Large. Nick is projecting the future: 
if this opportunity  turns to a deal, this will ensure him not only  reaching the order intake target, but more 
importantly it will help him significantly  with reaching his revenue targets in the next two years. However, 
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if Sales Large finds out about the opportunity through the CRM sy stem, they  will try  to get the customer 
(and thus all potential revenues) away  from him. Thus, by  recognizing the situation, and projecting how it 
could evolve, Nick chooses to set a lower value for his originally big opportunity, in order to decrease its 
prominence in the CRM sy stem. 
 “When you put such a big amount in CRM, people are going to see it, and people are also going to try to 
take the client away from you. For example, Large Enterprise. Because they say, “Oh one million, that 
shouldn’t be a medium client, that should be a large client, he has to come to us.” Then that discussion 
starts. So a lot of people say, “no, no, I don’t want to be in the spotlight”. I would do the same maybe, I 
would just put it for 200,000 while I know in my head that the opportunity is 1million, but I don’t want 
anybody else to know that it’s that big opportunity.”  (External account manager) 
Temporality and practices of visibility making through the CRM system 
In the prev ious paragraphs we described the practices through which account managers are de aling with 
the transparency  of the CRM sy stem information. We see that in order to deal with the consequences that 
they  may  face if their actions become v isible, they  often play  with the CRM data to fiddle with the reports 
and figures that render their actions v isible and often even prominent.  
“We play hide and seek. Yeah, it’s a game. It’s a game. Eh… Me personally, I’m not the person who is 
always doing that. Because I think yeah, I can say that it is 1million or I can say that it is 100,000. Yeah, 
I will sign it for 1million. I don’t care about that. But there are a lot of colleagues who will sign it for 
100,000 euros. It’s a game. It’s hide and seek. Yeah… It’s ridiculous when you think about it. Because, 
when you are looking at the predictability of the account managers, you are not predictable when you 
sign it for 100,000 while it’s 1million. So yeah, I don’t understand it, but it is happening.”  (Account 
manager in Sales Large) 
 Had the CRM sy stem not been there, TelCo would still try  to impose transparency, and account managers 
would still try to play  games. Nevertheless, the materiality  of the CRM sy stem not only intensifies the 
effect that numbers have on people’s behavior by  adding pressure to them, but it also reinforces an almost 
effortless engagement in this numbers game, as account managers can always edit the values of sales 
opportunities while the customer is in the “suspect” or “lead” phase in the funnel, without leaving traces.  
Information about the customers, the interactions with them, their sales opportunities and orders, 
becomes v isible across the whole organization. Sales managers, higher management, other account 
managers, specialists and other stakeholders can access this information in real time, so they  can respond 
quickly  to sales opportunities, running deals, and other incidents. The fact that th e data remains stored in 
the CRM system allows the account managers to use information about their account managers that was 
previously  stored by  others, but also to store information that will be useful in the future for a specialist, a 
customer service employee, or even another account manager.  
At the same time, all the stored data can haunt the account managers: e.g. a high opportunity  stored now 
will keep threatening their bonuses in the future for longer time, as it will be quickly  spotted in the CRM 
sy stem. Furthermore, the CRM sy stem makes the extraction of data for the preparations of reports and 
figures that help evaluate the performance of the account manager very  easy, and in fact much easier than 
a paper archive or even the use of Excel files. A naly tics features allow for almost automatic accumulation 
and summarization of the data in figures and tables, which can also be post -processed (e.g. by  ranking the 
sales opportunities based on their value), so that actors can quickly spot information that  is important to 
them (e.g. the sales manager seeing which major business opportunities come up in their team). Thus, 
when account managers fill in some information in the CRM sy stem, they  will almost automatically start 
projecting what impact this data will have on their future performance.  
The account managers can distort part of the data easier than before: in fact, while the customer is in the 
“suspect” or “lead” phase, they are responsible for it and thus have the freedom to add the values, codes 
etc. which they  prefer, as well as changing them back to the real estimated values later, without leav ing 
traces. After the specialist picks up on the lead and puts the customer in the “prospect” phase, the account 
managers themselves cannot directly  change the sales opportunities any more, only  track the funnel of the 
customer. This also implies that data from the past can be opaque only  on data such as sales opportunities 
that were never actualized, or sales interactions that were incomplete or missing.  
 Playing the Numbers Game: Dealing with Transparency 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 13 
Thus, the CRM sy stem triggers the actors to not only  make judgments in the present situa tion, but also to 
reflect on the past and project their future. In fact, the account managers know that their past, present 
and future are interwoven with the data in the CRM sy stem. Such a data-constructed reality , that 
constitutes not only a v iew of the present (e.g. current status of customers in the funnel), but also a view of 
the past (e.g. past orders) or the future (e.g. sales opportunities), is performed in the ongoing practices 
(Scott and Orlikowski 2014) of registering data in the CRM, creating figures and weekly  reports, 
monitoring these reports, and so on.  
Furthermore, we get to see that the transparency  that is perceived to be enabled by  the CRM sy stem often 
brings opportunities for opaqueness: as the account managers evaluate the influence that this data -
constructed reality  can have on their performance, being v isible to everyone and instantaneously , and 
know that they  have the ability  to shape it to some extent, they  choose to enact opaqueness at times. 
Consequently, we see performativity of transparency in practice (Roberts 2009).  
Thus, account managers choose to be transparent or opaque in the present, shaping the data-constructed 
reality of the present, as they are reflecting on the effects of the transparency  produced through the CRM 
sy stem in the past (e.g. weekly  reports for routine activ ities, o r having received pressure from colleagues 
on sales opportunities that were made v isible), and projecting their intentions for the near future (e.g. 
reaching the targets or avoiding pressure). Further, we see how the level of accuracy  in the data stored by  
previous enactments of transparency (e.g. customer interactions) or opaqueness practices (e.g. fake 
leads), which constitute a data-constructed reality  of the past, influence the account managers’ practical 
evaluations in the present (e.g. checking the CRM figures), and their expectations for the future (e.g. 
estimating whether he will reach his target). Finally, the account managers project how the sales 
opportunities and customer interactions that they  store for the future (shaping the future data -
constructed reality ) might influence their future situation (e.g. their targets in the next year), by 
identify ing with past experiences (e.g. how targets were calculated in the past y ears), and thus try  to 
influence their future through their actions in the present (being opaque or transparent).  
Discussion 
The performativity of transparency 
In this study  we have tried to unpack the performativity of transparency : i.e. transparency, hav ing 
sociomaterial agency , offers the possibility to enact not only v isibility,  but also opaqueness, on the things 
that it is aimed to shed light on. In order to do so, we have illustrated how account managers, as they 
enact the CRM technology, find themselves play ing a numbers game, switching modes between 
transparency and opaqueness to achieve their goals. The numbers (and other types of data) in this game 
are not merely  the resources through which account managers try  to attain their goals, but are actually 
actors themselves, having equal power to influence the account managers’ ac tions. Thus, transparency  is 
performative, in that it changes that which is rendered transparent. In other words, transparency  is not 
merely a guideline in the organization, but it is sociomaterially  constructed through the enactment of the 
CRM sy stem, while it triggers sociomaterial practices that reveal or conceal the information about the 
customers and the actions of account managers. Other material forms that could also make employees’ 
actions transparent, such as paper archives or the exchange of Excel files via e-mail, would not trigger the 
same sociomaterial practices. Account managers are well aware that whatever they  do has a material 
effect: for example, all information they  store about their customers, sales opportunities and customer 
interactions becomes v isible to many  different actors and in real time, thus making their exposure, 
performance evaluation, and so forth much easier than other forms of transparency. Hence, they will try 
to influence that material effect and play  with the numbers and other data they  store, according to how 
they  evaluate the situation at hand (using not only  their perceptions but also by  making sense of the data -
constructed reality  captured in the CRM sy stem) and the ways through which the CRM sy stem can make 
things transparent (e.g. ranking of sales opportunities based on their value, or calculation of white spots). 
The fact that the changes that they  make in the stored values in the CRM sy stem do not leave any  traces, 
compared to a paper archive for example, also highlights the importance of the materiality  of this 
technology in enacting the opaqueness practices.  
In order to better understand the performativ ity  of transparency, we also have to recognize that all 
sociomaterial practices of making the employee’s actions visible to other employees and managers are 
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oriented towards a temporal orientation: The data and functions of the CRM system are not only related 
to what is happening in the present, but also refer to the past and can even help project the future, thus 
making the material effects of transparency  even more perceptible. Consequently, at every  moment in the 
present, the account manager is oriented towards a data-constructed reality  of the present, past, or future, 
while simultaneously  considering the data-constructed realities and the situation in the other two 
temporal orientations. It is through this trichordal temporal orientation (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), 
that transparency  actually  works as a blind, which can open and render things transparent, but it can also 
close and make them opaque.  
In figure 1  we illustrate this dynamic of shifting modes from transparency  to opaqueness in practices of 
v isibility  making, through the materiality of digital technologies and the different temporal orientations. 
More specifically, we can see that transparency  can trigger both practices of being transparent or being 
opaque. Reflecting on how a practice of making something transparent was enacted in the past could 
influence people to choose whether they  will make some information transparent or opaque in order to 
influence their present or future. On the other hand, our analysis showed that reflecting on the 
opaqueness of the past would only lead to enacting opaqueness also in the present.  
 
Figure 1.  Visualizing the performativity of transparency 
 
Theoretical implications 
The insights of this study inform past v iews on IS which have considered information systems as way s to 
increase transparency  in the organization, looking at technologies such as enterprise systems,  knowledge 
management systems, management information systems, and other sy stems, as way s to develop an 
information panopticon (Burton-Jones 2014; Elmes et al. 2005; Zuboff 1988). Instead, our study  suggests 
that the transparency enabled by  such sy stems often triggers opaqueness, whic h can be enacted through 
the same technologies that are perceived as forms of transparency. In so doing, our study  indicates that 
that transparency  and opaqueness are not merely  observability  and concealment of employees’ actions 
respectively. Instead, we need to develop a more sophisticated understanding of these concepts, that takes 
into consideration their material effects. For example, account managers often make their actions 
transparent because they  want to effectively  coordinate the sales process with their colleagues, or to retain 
knowledge of the customers. At other moments in time though, the effects on their targets or the 
competition with others matter more they  may  have to face the consequences on their targets. The 
flexibility  that they  have to go back to the CRM sy stem and change something from opaque to transparent 
makes the interrelation between transparency and opaqueness even more nuanced.  
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The paper contributes to recent studies that highlight the tension between transparency  and opaqueness 
by  looking at the development of opaqueness practices for productivity  (Bernstein 2012), use of 
performance data for impression management (Cunha 2013), the use of shadow sy stems as a fo rm of 
material loose coupling (Berente and Yoo 2012), imperfect numbers in performance measurement 
(Andon et al. 2007 ; Dambrin and Robson 2011), practices of calculation and fraud in accounting (Boll 
2014; Cooper et al. 2013; Neu et al. 2013), and so forth. Our analysis of the performativ ity  of transparency 
contributes to these studies, by  analyzing the sociomaterial practices through which transparency  and 
opaqueness are produced. Our use of the chordal triad of agency  (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) helps 
extend the work of Hansen and Flyverbom (2014) on how digital technologies afford transparency  with a 
temporal orientation.  
Furthermore, the study  contributes to the studies in organizations that take a performative perspective 
(Gond et al. 2015), and particularly  to studies of technology in organizations (Orlikowski and Scott 2014, 
2015), by  highlighting the temporality that is inherent in the notion of performativity. The study at TelCo 
shows that sociomaterial practices reconfigure reality  along a temporal dimension. In other words, the 
enactments of sociomaterial practices can draw the attention towards the past, present, or future and 
perform different consequentialities. For example, the interaction of account managers and sales 
managers with the weekly  report on sales opportunities draws the attention to the account managers with 
substantially  high opportunities, increases the pressure on them, and thus influences how the account 
managers interact with the sy stem in the future, e.g. by  choosing to store a lower value in the system to 
“stay  under the radar”.  
The insights of the study also provide implications for practitioners seeking to use digital technologies to 
increase transparency in their organization, suggesting that the materiality  of these technologies, 
combined with the way  they  evaluate their employees, will have a significant impact on how the 
employees will enact the technology, and thus render their actions transparent or opaque to the 
organization. For example, if the CRM sy stem at TelCo generated a digital trac e every time an account 
manager would edit the sales opportunity in the sy stem, it would probably  limit the opaqueness in the 
sy stem, as account managers would know that their changes would be monitored. 
Limitations and boundary conditions 
Despite the aforementioned contributions, our study  involves certain limitations: First of all, we were not 
able to follow the account managers in their v isits to the customers, due to confidentiality reasons.  Since 
we could not observe this part of their practice, we had to rely  on their accounts and compare the 
descriptions amongst multiple respondents. In addition, our limited encounters with the directors of 
TelCo (two interviews in total) made it difficult for us to illustrate their involvement in the numbers 
games, although our data often implied that to some extent opaqueness was tolerated by higher 
management. Finally, the bureaucratic structure and the culture of TelCo set a boundary  condition for the 
generalizability  of our findings. More specifically, the number s games might emerge differently  in a 
smaller organization with a flat structure, in which the higher management may  be situated closer to the 
employees and evaluate them more by observing them in their work rather than by using quantifications.  
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